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ABSTRACT
EURECA is a retrievable space platform which
can perform multi-disciplinary scientific and
technological experiments in a Low Earth Orbit
for a typical mission duration of six to twelve
months. It is deployed and retrieved by the NASA
Space Shuttle and is designed to support up to
five flights. The first mission started at the end of
July 1992 and was successfully completed with
the retrieval in June 1993.
The operations concept and the ground segment
for the first EURECA mission are briefly
introduced. The experiences in the preparation
and the conduction of the mission from the flight
control team point of view are described.
Key Words: EURECA, Spacecraft Operations,
Fault Management, On-Board Autonomy,
Rendezvous Operations.
1. INTRODUCTION
The EURECA mission represented in many
aspects a completely new challenge from the
mission control point of view. The main features
were the extremely limited ground contact, about
5% of the total mission time during the science
phase, which demanded a high level of on-board
autonomy (Ferri and Wimmer, 1994; Htibner and
Wimmer, 1994), the deployment and retrieval by
the Shuttle, including the safety aspects related to
the manned spaceflight, the rendezvous activities
and the complex inter-agency operations involving
the Orbiter, two control centres, ground stations
and data relay satellites, the concept of packetised
telemetry and telecommands, for the first time
fully implemented on a European spacecraft, and
the large number of possible payload
configurations.
After launch and deployment by the Shuttle into a
424 km circular orbit, EURECA was manoeuvred
to the operational orbit of 508 km altitude, where
the microgravity environment was established.
This was followed by a ten month science phase
in which the experiments, in the area of
microgravity science, space science and space
technology were performed under low
acceleration conditions. About one month before
the predicted time of launch of the retrieval Shuttle
a series of orbital manoeuvres to lower the orbit
and to match the retrieval orbital requirements
commenced. Shortly before the launch of the
retrieval Shuttle EURECA concluded all orbital
manoeuvres, and the Orbiter reached it after a
three days flight, capturing the spacecraft, safely
storing it in the cargo-bay and returning it to Earth
after 11 months of flight and more than 5000
revolutions around our planet. For a detailed
summary of the EURECA mission, see Wimmer
and Ferri (1994).
The EURECA ground segment was designed
around the main mission characteristics (Ferri and
Kellock, 1992). During the science mission phase
contact with the spacecraft was achieved via two
ESA ground stations at Maspalomas and Kourou,
and a control centre located in Darmstadt, which
could also make use of a third station in Perth as a
back-up. These ground stations provided in total a
daily sequence of about eight contact periods of 5
to 10 minutes, spaced by 90 minutes. A long non-
coverage period of about 9 hours occurred
between two consecutive sequences of station
passes.
During the critical mission phases i.e. during
deployment, orbit manoeuvres and retrieval
operations, the third ground station at Perth was
added, to increase the contact time.
In the phases when EURECA was attached to or
in proximity of the Shuttle, contact with the
spacecraft was established via the NASA
Communications Network (NASCOM), the
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NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS)
system and the Orbiter, which guaranteed a
practically continuous coverage.
2. MISSION CONTROL CONCEPT
AND EXPERIENCES
The manifold characteristics of EURECA's
mission profile and the high degree of autonomy
and new techniques integrated on-board, required
a ground control system and a control concept
(Van Casteren and Ferri, 1989) capable of
supporting both, a traditional on-line and an
advanced off-line operations approach. The
traditional approach was characterised by manual
uplink of individual telecommands, housekeeping
telemetry monitoring and alarm processing. The
advanced approach involved typically the
activation of on-board application programs for
implementing the required operations. The
corresponding commands were prepared while the
spacecraft was not in contact with the control
centre. During ground coverage periods the
accumulated spacecraft telemetry was dumped to
ground via a high speed link and the prepared
series of time tagged commands were uplinked.
The execution verification of the on-board
activities was based on event messages from the
application programs and took place when the
spacecraft was not visible anymore to the
groundstation.
In this section the characteristics of the operation
concept related to the different mission phases are
briefly described, followed by a discussion on the
most important experiences and lessons leamed.
The two major verification activities before the
start of the mission were the System Validation
Tests (SVT), to verify all functions of the mission
control system and the operational database via a
direct link with the real spacecraft, and the
simulation campaign, which started about six
months before launch and was resumed during
the last weeks of the mission to test the new
timelines of the retrieval phase. The main purpose
of the simulations was to validate the FOP and to
train the mission control team in all activities of
the mission. The simulation programme for
EURECA culminated in the joint simulations with
the participation of ESOC, the NASA MCC and
the Shuttle crew.
The major problem encountered in this phase was
the lack of proper documentation on spacecraft
design and functionality. Although this tends to
be a common problem of many space projects, in
the case of EURECA it was particularly serious
due to the complexity of the spacecraft and the
large amount of software functions implemented
which were not sufficiently described and kept
changing during the spacecraft integration process
until very late in the programme. This had a severe
impact on the workload required for the
preparation of the operational database. Frequent
changes and corrections were necessary to adapt
the database to the new documentation or to the
changes in the software. In addition, the lack of
previous experience with the packet telemetry
concept caused a significant underestimation of
the work required for the preparation of the
telemetry database.
Mission Preparation
The main purpose of the mission preparation
activities of the Flight Control Team was to
specify the requirements for all the EURECA
dedicated ground segment facilities, to customise
the mission control software via the preparation of
an operational database driving the telemetry
processing and the telecommand generation
functions, and finally to prepare and validate,
based on the spacecraft users manual and other
design documentation, the Flight Operation Plan
(FOP). This document contains the detailed
timelines of all phases of the mission and all the
nominal and contingency procedures foreseen for
the conduction of the spacecraft and payload
operations.
Another underestimation of the mission
preparation effort, also caused by the lack of
previous experience, occurred in the area of the
interface with NASA. The activities related to the
NASA interface involved operational discussion,
par!icipation to meetings and telecons, formal
rewew of NASA documentation, preparation and
execution of joint integrated simulations. This
work had to be carried out by the flight control
team in parallel to the other normal mission
preparation activities. This problem became
evident and highly dangerous during the mission,
when similar activities had to be carried out in
preparation of the retrieval mission, while the
demanding mission control activities of the
science phase had to be conducted in parallel by
the same people.
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The System Validation Tests for the EURECA
mission were also anomalous, in comparison to
previous projects. The incomplete status of the
spacecraft at the time of the first test slot,
combined with the frequent announcements of
launch delays due to the unstable situation of the
Shuttle programme after the Challenger accident
extended the test phase to a period of two and a
half years, during which more than ten weeks of
actual test time with the spacecraft were utilised by
ESOC. Although a large part of this time was
spent re-testing spacecraft subsystems and
functions which did not properly work the first
time, the extended test time available for ESOC
(for a typical project four to five weeks of test
time are reserved for SVT in the last year before
launch) allowed the flight control team to integrate
the knowledge of spacecraft design and
functionality which could not be satisfactorily
built on the documentation. The disadvantage of
this approach was that a large amount of
unforeseen manpower had to be invested in this
phase, reducing the quality of the other mission
preparation activities.
The preparation of the science operations phase
suffered, as a consequence of the above
mentioned problems, from the little time dedicated
to the definition of nominal procedures for
planning and conduction of the routine activities.
The software developed for the mission planning
tasks was too rigid and restrictive to cope with
changing planning requirements and revised
payload control concepts. This did not help
reducing the overload of the flight control team in
the execution of the daily activities, it even
required additional manpower for extending the
mission planning software and integrating it into
the working environment. Other software tools
available to the team also created some problems,
due to unfriendly user interfaces or insufficient
support functions. The characteristics of the
EURECA flight control team also caused an
uneven distribution of work among the different
team members. This situation evolved as a
consequence of the fact that the team was based
on a small group of engineers who worked on the
mission preparation for many years, until only a
few months before launch a number of new
engineers was added. The result was that the
experienced engineers were ovedgaded and had
little time, in the last critical months before launch
and during the mission itself, to gradually pass
responsibilities to the new team members. In
addition the short duration of the mission, the
number of spacecraft failures during the science
phase, and the intense activities in preparation of
the retrieval, which started only a few months after
launch, resulted in never reaching a stable, routine
phase of the mission operations, in which
procedures and responsibilities could have been
effectively consolidated.
The experience of the EURECA mission
preparation showed that an earlier team build up is
absolutely required for a mission of this level of
complexity. A kernel of at least five operations
engineers should work on the project, in
conjunction with the spacecraft and ground
segment developers, for several years before
launch. The interface with NASA has to be given
more emphasis within and outside the flight
control team at ESOC. This implies that the
nomination of a Flight Director for a mission
involving joint operations with the NASA Shuttle
environment should occur at least two years
before launch, to allow him to familiarise himself
with the mission and to supervise the discussions
on operational interfaces. The problems
encountered with the database generation and lack
of information on the spacecraft design could be
solved by allowing a deeper and earlier
involvement of the ESOC operations personnel in
the spacecraft development and particularly in the
related integration and testing activities.
Critical Mission Phases
A detailed description and analysis of the critical
deployment and retrieval operations can be found
in Ferri et al. (1993); this section presents a
general overview and the most important
experiences.
Twelve hours after launch in the cargo-bay of the
Space Shuttle Atlantis on the mission STS-46, the
EURECA internal power was initially activated by
the Shuttle astronauts via switches located in the
crew compartment. The commanding activities
started immediately after reception of the first
telemetry via the NASCOM network. The
spacecraft was lifted by the Shuttle robotic arm
out of the cargo-bay, while the spacecraft
activation continued, including the deployment of
the RF antennae and the solar array wings. After
release from the Shuttle, the three-axes stabilised
attitude was acquired, and the preparation for the
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first orbit manoeuvre continued. Due to a number
of unforeseen fine-tuning activities in the software
tables driving the attitude control subsystem on-
board and a problem in the ground control
computers the orbit manoeuvre was delayed by
four days.
The orbit manoeuvre phases were critical phases
of the mission to be handled only via the ESA
ground stations. The deployment manoeuvres
were executed nominally after the correction of an
interface problem between two ground computers,
causing wrong software parameters to be uplinked
to the spacecraft, which delayed the start of the
phase. The retrieval manoeuvres, however,
uncovered deficiencies in the design of the attitude
and orbit control subsystems. First of all, the non-
negligible orbital effects of the attitude control in
some control modes using hydrazine was
underestimated in the design and caused
significant changes and higher risks in the
conduction of the entire retrieval campaign. The
effect of attitude mode changes had to be
measured and taken into account in the orbit
manoeuvre strategies, but this with a low
confidence since many of the mode changes were
executed autonomously by the spacecraft and
were to a certain extent unpredictable. The loss of
two gyroscopes during the nominal mission left
the spacecraft with no redundancy for the final
phases, but also uncovered a problem in the
attitude control software which had to be worked
around via complicated and dangerous operational
procedures. Finally a problem in the on-board
software in charge of compensating the gyro drift
was detected by chance before the start of the first
descent orbit manoeuvre. The manoeuvre strategy
and procedures had to be changed, and a number
of unsuccessful attempts had to be executed
before a stable work-around approach was
defined and the retrieval orbit was reached.
After three days of approach, the Shuttle orbiter
reached the proximity of EURECA, which in the
meantime had stopped all orbit manoeuvres. In the
last revolution around the Earth ESOC configured
the spacecraft for retrieval in the Shuttle bay,
slewing in a predefined attitude, retracting solar
array and antennae, and deactivating and safing all
the hazardous subsystems like the hydrazine
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reaction control system. The final approach of the
Shuttle proceeded nominally and the spacecraft
was first captured with the robotic arm, and later
stowed into the cargo-bay and deactivated. A
problem in the final latching of the RF antennae to
the body of the spacecraft forced an EVA (Extra-
Vehicular Activity) to manually press the antenna
booms while ESOC was commanding the latches.
This was successfully executed the next day and
EURECA returned safely to Earth at the end of
the Shuttle mission, a few days later.
The retrieval phase scenario was simpler than the
deployment one, and the decision to execute all
the time-critical deactivation operations
automatically on-board via a time-tagged sequence
of commands removed most of the criticality and
in particular the dependence from the ground
contact which, due to the communications
problems experienced in the deployment phase,
was not fully trusted. As an additional back-up,
NASA offered to add a number of NASA and
RTS ground stations for the duration of the
critical retrieval phases. The need for an
operational contact with EURECA via the
additional station did not materialise, but their
presence helped in increasing the confidence in
the success of the mission. The criticality of the
retrieval operations mainly derived from the
degradation of the spacecraft performance, in
particular in the area of power and in the number
of gyroscopes available for attitude control.
Fortunately no additional major failures occurred
during the final phase of the mission, and every
major subsystem performed nominally.
The nature of the deployment and retrieval phases
dictated a typical real-time approach to the
operational documentation: detailed timelines were
produced for the nominal and main contingency
cases, which would merge in time order all the
activities of all the parties involved. For the Shuttle
proximity phases the three timelines of the Orbiter
crew (Flight Plan), of the Houston MCC (Ops
Support Timeline) and of ESOC (Flight Ops
Plan) had to be synchronised. Details of the
activities like commands and monitoring
parameters were contained in flight control
procedures called by the timelines.
The mission control team at ESOC was
established according to the standard approach
adopted for other projects, with three main groups
of controllers responsible for spacecraft
operations, ground segment operations and flight
dynamics, under the central authority of the Flight
Operations Director. Consultancy on all aspects
of spacecraft design and functionality was
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provided by the project support team, formed by
experts of the spacecraft manufacturers and the
ESA project team. For both deployment and
retrieval phases one of the main critical aspects
was the crew safety constraints on the EURECA
operations. Due to the very limited visibility of the
EURECA status available to the Shuttle crew and
to the NASA flight controllers, this was fully
delegated to ESOC. When EURECA was in the
Shuttle cargo bay or in its proximity the safety
status of the spacecraft was continuously
monitored at ESOC and reported to the NASA
mission controllers. Multiple failure tolerance was
implemented in the mission control software to
avoid inadvertent uplinking of hazardous
commands to the spacecraft at the wrong time.
One of the difficult tasks was to continuously
derive the safety status of the spacecraft from the
available telemetry, which in some cases was not
complete and explicit enough for a real-time
judgment, in particular in the activation and
deactivation phases, when the spacecraft
configuration was continuously changing. One of
the improvements successfully implemented in the
flight control team at ESOC for the retrieval
mission was the assignment of a dedicated
operations engineer to the safety monitoring,
assessment and reporting to the Flight Director.
Concerning the experience gained in the
EURECA critical phases it should be stressed that
in particular the deployment phase suffered a
large number of major anomalies, many of which
occurring in parallel, which were kept under
control without any impact on the crew safety nor
on the mission success, and with only minor
delays. From the errors discovered in the on-
board attitude control parameters and in the
communications between the thermal control and
the data handling subsystem important lessons
could be learned in the way autonomous functions
have to be implemented and operated.
An important experience resulting from the
retrieval phase was the preparation and execution
of the EVA procedure to latch the antenna booms.
The frenetic preparation of a completely new
procedure in the night before the EVA became
necessary due to a double failure situation, the
antenna latching problem and the failure of the
power interface via the robotic arm to the
EURECA thermal control, which forced the
ground controllers to berth the spacecraft with
unlatched antennae, to avoid thermal problems.
This starting position for the EVA was not
foreseen, and the final success of the activity was
a major achievement in the overall NASA-ESA
cooperation for this mission.
The traditional approach to the critical mission
phase operations proved to be successful in this
extremely dramatic scenario; the deficiencies in
the timely monitoring of safety items was
successfully corrected in the retrieval phase by the
introduction of a dedicated controller position.
Science Operations Phase
Eighteen days after launch the spacecraft was
successfully configured for the science operations
phase, including the activation of the freon cooling
loop, the micro-gravity measurement system, and
the low-thrust attitude control system. In addition
each payload instrument was at least activated
once and checked out. The ground segment
configuration was characterised by an off-line
operations scheme and a close interface with the
Project Scientist, who coordinated the input of the
more than 30 scientists, representing them in the
EURECA Weekly Operations Review Meeting at
ESOC. The science community could receive
telemetry data electronically in their home
institutes via an active Data Disposition System;
Principal Investigators were able to request
changes to the configuration of their instrument
via a Telecommand Request interface (via FAX or
E-Mail) in response to their evaluation of
spacecraft and payload telemetry.
The mission operations scheme applied during the
science operations phase consisted of three main
tasks: mission planning, real-time pass operations
and spacecraft performance monitoring.
The mission planning task was performed daily in
order to prepare al! inputs required for both the
pass operations and the spacecraft performance
monitoring. Based mainly on a version of the
Mission Baseline Plan updated every two weeks,
on decisions taken in the last Weekly Operations
Review Meeting, on the most recent Telecommand
Requests, and on the potential feedback from the
monitoring task, a file was prepared which
contained the commands to be uplinked to the on-
board Master Schedule during the next ground
contact periods. In addition, detailed instructions
for non-standard operations to be carded out by
the spacecraft controllers during the next ground
station passes were prepared on paper.
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Spacecraft Controllers were in charge of
preparingand conducting the passoperations.
Flight Control Procedures(FCP) detailed the
required standardactivities suchas uplink of
telecommands,MasterSchedule,monitoring of
telemetry,dumpof on-boardmemoryandtransfer
of dumpeddata from the groundstation to the
control centre.A shortlist of basichealthchecks
were part of the standard activities to be
performed in every pass.The resultsof these,
togetherwith thealarmsraisedautomaticallyby
the control software in case of out-of-limit
conditionsin the telemetry,were usedto detect
severeanomaliesof the spacecraftin real-time.
Only in very few cases,requiringeasyandwell
defined recovery actions, on-line Contingency
Recovery Procedurescould be usedduring the
short passes.For all other anomalies,off-line
recoverystrategieswereapplied,eitherby anon-
call systemengineeringsupportor aspartof the
performancemonitoringtask.
SpacecraftPerformanceMonitoring normally
startedwhenall thetelemetrygenerateduringthe
day, downlinked from the spacecraft and
temporarily stored in the ground stations,was
receivedandpre-processedat ESOC,andall the
post-passactivitieswerecompleted.Basedon the
resultsof telemetryandtelecommandverification
checks,automaticallyperformedby the control
system,findingsduring the manualscreeningof
report andexceptionmessagesandresultsfrom
the special checkseventually indicated in the
instructionsfrom themissionplanner,theoverall
spacecraftperformancecould beassessed,andin
particularthe successfulexecutionof operations
verified. If recoveryactionswererequired,these
wereturnedinto internalTelecommandRequests
andhandedover to theengineerin chargeof the
next planning session. Once per week the
activities were reportedto anddiscussedin the
WeeklyOperationsReviewMeeting.
The sequence of the science operations was
mainly driven by the limited availability of electric
power and external events or constraints. Long
term experiments, in particular those which could
not be interrupted without endangering their
mission product were given precedence in
planning. Further resources to be considered
during planning were the on-board storage
capacity, the amount of application programs
allowed to be run in parallel and the available
cooling capability.
The science operations could be implemented to a
large extent according to the schedule laid down
in the baseline plan prepared pre-mission. All
science objectives, with few exceptions when
severe equipment failures were encountered, could
be fulfilled in the first 5 and a half months of the
science mission phase. After this time the freon
cooling system had to be deactivated, due to
power shortages caused by the degradation of the
solar panels, excluding operations of actively
cooled payloads from that time onwards.
However, the rest of the payload could continue
operating, resulting in an over-performance of up
to 175% w.r.t, the planned science program.
Highlights of the payload operations (for details
see Innocenti and Mesland, 1993) were, among
others, the first use of an inter-orbit
communications link via Olympus satellite for
operational purposes (uplink of Master Schedule,
Nov. 24, 1993), the direct transmission of payload
telemetry to home institutes (Oct. 15, 1993), the
parallel operations of solar science instruments
with their 'sister instruments' on the ATLAS-2
mission flown on a Space Shuttle, the successful
EURECA depointing to support additional
WATCH observations of different areas of the X-
ray sky.
Most of the payload instruments experienced
anomalies during the mission. The most severe
cases encountered were the loss of the
Radiofrequency Ion Thruster Assembly (RITA)
quite early in the mission, the problems of the
primary cooling system in the Protein
Crystallisation Facility, and the Timeband Capture
Cell Experiment foil movement failure. Other
payload instruments showed relatively minor
problems, often in the area of the communication
functions with the data handling subsystem, which
could be worked-around operationally and did not
seriously reduce their science return.
The functionality and the Man-Machine Interface
of several tools in the working environment of the
operations team were not appropriate to the tasks
they were used for. This had to be overcome by
many additional manual steps, which were very
time consuming and error-prone (e.g. long
sequences of commands with many parameters
had to be typed in by hand because no interface
existed between the computer which received the
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data electronically as part of Telecommand
Requests and the control system computer).
Many of these shortcomings arose because
functions had to be dropped during the
implementation stage due to time or budget
limitations.
During its eleven months in orbit EURECA
experienced a relatively high number of on-board
anomalies, which had to be recovered from
ground or counteracted by operational work-
around solutions. Development, testing and
execution of work-around solutions put a
significant additional workload on the operations
team. In particular in the beginning of the mission,
when frequent communications outages between
payload or subsystems and the data handling
subsystem had to be recovered manually from
ground, the pass-operations were seriously
affected. Very often the scheduled pass activities,
in particular dumping of telemetry from the on-
board storage, had to be delayed or spread over
several passes.
For the spacecraft performance monitoring the
on-board communications problems caused
further difficulties because the observability of the
spacecraft temperatures was lost completely until
recovery, i.e. either corrupted or old data were
downlinked during this time. This data had to be
manually filtered out if used for further analysis
until a specific filter program was developed. A
new on-board software was developed in the first
weeks of the mission to recover autonomously
from the above problems (Domesle et al., 1994)
This reduced the observability outages and
simplified the pass operations significantly.
Unfortunately the new software could not
completely solve the problem due to other
software design limitations on-board, therefore
recovery was still left to the ground about once
very fortnight.
; progressive and unpredictable degradation of
'olar array performance forced the flight
_1team to take additional power margin into
,t in science operations planning.
nore a special passive retrieval scenario
developed, in case the power loss would
to support the retrieval as planned.
_ the initial tendency of the solar array
did not continue and/no mission
lad to be sacrificed, nor had an
recovery scenario to be applied.
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However, the impact of this degradation on
science operations was limited only due to the fact
that a high power consumer instrument, RITA,
failed after one month operation, releasing a large
amount of power to the rest of the payload.
For many of the anomalies encountered work-
around solutions could be found. This process
however did not only require to reconfigure on-
board items or to uplink new on-board software,
but also to update operational documentation like
in the User Manual and the FOP. In some cases
new software had to be written for special
evaluation purposes. Before a decision on a work-
around solution could be taken, potential side-
effects had to be excluded. This was extremely
difficult in those areas where little on-board
changes could develop large effects (e.g. in the
area of Attitude Control Subsystem fault
management software), or complex dependencies
between real-time procedures (e.g. power
degradation fault management) were not
sufficiently documented, In some cases work-
around solutions could not be applied since a final
assessment of the side effects coui d not be made
with the available simulation tools on ground. In
other cases it was found out later that side-effects
had been overlooked.
Summarising the experiences from this phase it
must be said that the operations concept used for
this mission phase was in general well suited to
the mission characteristics. Its inherent flexibility
allowed to implement the planned mission
operations, to isolate and recover almost all
observed anomalies and to define all required
work-around solutions without introducing
significant delays to the mission progress. Critical
operations, like On-Board Software Maintenance
activities, could be integrated in this approach as
well. Weak points have been identified in the
functions and the man-machine interface of the
tools in the operations environment, which could
be improved without major efforts. Problems
encountered on the spacecraft seem to imply the
need for more robust and flexible functionalities,
on-board and on-ground, in order to cope with
unforeseen anomalies and to support the
implementation of work-around solutions. As a
multiple work-around solutions situation becomes
extremely difficult to manage, an increased effort
should be spent during spacecraft development
and test.
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Lessons Learned
EURECA provided an excellent opportunity to
build up a unique operational expertise in Europe
in the following areas: manned spaceflight,
including commanding and crew safety
responsibilities; rendezvous activities; joint
operations with NASA involving Shuttle, data-
relay satellites, and complex ground segments;
multidisciplinary science missions in low Earth
orbit; advanced autonomous space-segments.
In running this mission a wide range of
experiences was gained by using the spacecraft
and the ground segment and by applying the
described operations approach. The main lessons
learned in the different areas are summarised in
the following.
Spacecraft. Design, development and testing
should aim to produce highly robust, flexible, and
reliable components in order to avoid failures and
malfunctions on one hand and to minimise the
impact of unforseen anomalies on other
components. Critical areas in this respect seem to
be the on-board communication and autonomous
functions, which caused most of the severe
anomalies in the mission with often dangerous
side-effects. Completeness, stability, and early
availability of a Spacecraft User Manual is very
_mportant to avoid overload situations for the
flight control team during the final phase of the
mission preparation.
Ground Segment. Flexible tools and man-
machine-interfaces, well adapted to the often
variable needs of mission control, play a very
important role in the ability and capability to
implement operational work-around solutions.
particularly sensitive in this aspect are mission
planning tools. For missions of the complexity of
EURECA the flight control team should be built
up several years before launch, to cope with the
workload required for inter-agencies cooperation,
database work, FOP preparation and verification
activities.
Operations Concept. After extending the flight
control team structure for critical phases by a
dedicated safety engineer position, the operations
scheme used in this missions was well suited to
the mission. All encountered anomalies, even
those occurring in parallel, could be successfully
handled without delaying the mission progress.
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3. CONCLUSIONS
The success of the EURECA A 1 mission is the
proved that the basic operations concept, the
ground and space segment design were adequate.
Several shortcomings in the system could be
identified before and during the mission for which
relatively simple solutions can be implemented for
a future flight. Since the satellite needs only a
relatively small funding in order to be prepared
for another flight (about 67.6 MAU for all
industrial costs, including launch support), and
there are still EURECA slots allocated on NASA's
shuttle manifest, a unique opportunity exists to
repeat the success of the EURECA A 1 mission on
a second fight in the near future.
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